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Abstract 
Class has become the social condition that dare not it speak its name in the 
devolved Scotland. This is despite the persistence of marked class divisions 
and structured inequalities within contemporary Scottish society. We critically 
examine the most empirically sophisticated and coherent analysis of social 
class in Scotland, that provided by ‘the Edinburgh school’ of social scientists, 
particularly their claim that Scotland is now a prosperous, ‘professional 
society’ where only a small but significant minority are trapped in poverty. This 
paper further considers the extent to which ‘devolution’, and the dominant 
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representations to which it has given rise, serve to generate a series of other 
myths in which class is both devalued but simultaneously mobilised in the 
negative portrayal of some of the most disadvantaged sections of the working 
class. Against an emerging, home-grown view of ‘New Scotland’ as a 
prosperous ‘Smart, Successful Scotland’, poverty and wealth inequalities 
continue to be a necessary feature of the division of labour. In Scotland, as 
elsewhere, class remains the pivot-point around which much of social policy is 
encoded and enacted. 
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Ignoring and Insisting on Class 
In Scotland, as elsewhere, class remains the primary determinant of social 
life. Historically, politics and culture in Scotland have been formed by a 
sharpened class consciousness and class-based organisations. Intellectually 
and ideologically, class represented the Archimedean point of reference that 
helped to explain everything from voting patterns and attitudinal differences, 
political mobilisation, social conflict, to lifestyle and consumption patterns, and 
even personality traits. Yet, the concept of class no longer occupies centre 
stage in devolutionary Scotland. Academic, policy and journalistic discourses 
about Scottish society have been largely de-classed. To draw attention to this 
eradication of class from the policy lexicon is hardly to make a controversial 
claim. Class, as Andrew Sayer (2005: 1) put it, has become ‘an embarrassing 
and unsettling subject’. As such, class has been excised from much of the 
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analysis of UK policy-making as a whole. There is something approaching a 
consensus that class has declined as a significant factor in the routine 
structuring of social and economic relations in contemporary society. While 
such claims have been criticised from widely different perspectives (see for 
example Savage, 2000; Skeggs, 2004; Sayer, 2005), they take on a particular 
resonance and meaning in the context of devolved welfare governance in the 
UK.  
 
Class has become the social condition that dare not it speak its name in the 
New Scotland. This is despite the persistence of marked class divisions and 
structured inequalities within contemporary Scottish society. In particular it is 
claimed here that in the New Scotland there is a recurring identification of that 
part of the working class suffering most from the effects of the restructured 
division of labour as ‘a problem’. Such ‘problem’ groups occupy a highly 
precarious relationship to the means of social reproduction through the labour 
market. In neglecting the structural barriers to adequate social reproduction 
this vulnerable fraction of the working class becomes the object of over-
lapping pathologisation processes – in relation to social inclusion policies, in 
debates around educational attainment, in relation to patterns of ill-health and 
morbidity, and, most publicly, in the mass media, in relation to questions of 
criminal justice, especially around urban youth crime, and sensationalised 
news reporting. For instance, during 2003 and 2004 something approaching a 
moral panic appeared in the Scottish press over urban youth, or what is 
referred to as ‘ned culture’, and anti-social cultures of violence, drugs and 
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alcohol, fuelled in no small part by the Scottish Executive’s determination to 
publicise its commitment to ‘law and order’ (Law, 2006).  
 
Class therefore continues to be a rarely spoken but pivotal element of 
contemporary Scottish governance. Under the terms of neo-liberal 
governance class has been devalued and usurped by the self-improvement of 
the individual personality as an entrepreneurial self. When the persistence of 
class as a social relationship cannot be wholly avoided a range of coy 
euphemisms are deployed that further obscure the character of class divisions 
in modern Scotland. Against an emerging, home-grown view of ‘New 
Scotland’, a singular, prosperous ‘Smart, Successful Scotland’, poverty and 
wealth inequalities continue to be a necessary feature of the division of labour 
in Scotland.  
 
Even where the extent of poverty and deepening inequality is registered class 
may be reduced to a descriptive variable, as only one among other equally 
significant variables in complex systems of stratification, and thereby, in our 
view, minimised as an explanatory concept. We therefore turn our attention to 
the most empirically sophisticated and coherent analysis of social class in 
Scotland, that provided by the group of social scientists at Edinburgh 
University (whom we term ‘the Edinburgh school’ for convenience). Through a 
series of empirical studies and their house journal, Scottish Affairs, they have 
had a significant impact on public and policy discourses in Scotland than 
perhaps is the case elsewhere in the UK. In so doing, the Edinburgh school 
have transformed the study of Scotland, helping shed the charge of 
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parochialism in the study of class and nation in a small country like Scotland 
(McCrone, 2005). Indeed, they have consistently addressed the wider issue of 
what constitutes national ‘society’. In contrast, for too many social scientists in 
the devolved UK, England and Britain are still treated as unproblematically 
coterminous and simply assumed as a universal frame of reference. Hence, 
even where class is made the subject of sustained analysis, as in a recent 
themed issue of the scholarly journal Sociology (2005) on ‘Class, Culture and 
Identity’, most contributors took for granted England as their societal frame of 
reference and made only passing mention, if any, to the national specificity of 
their studies. So while there is a well developed sociology of Scotland no 
comparable ‘sociology of England’ has yet emerged. Such remains the 
unacknowledged reifying power of England-Britain, what Michael Billig (1995) 
termed ‘banal nationalism’, that nation and class become universal 
abstractions. While the Edinburgh school have played a key role in ensuring 
that ‘nation’ is at the forefront of sociological concerns in Scotland their 
approach to class shares some of the same conceptual assumptions as 
elsewhere. We therefore go on to critique the self-imposed limitations of the 
Edinburgh school’s analysis of class in Scotland, couched as it is in terms of 
market power rather than the social relations of production.  
 
This paper further considers the extent to which ‘devolution’, and the 
dominant representations to which it has given rise, serve to generate a series 
of other myths in which class is both devalued but simultaneously mobilised in 
the negative portrayal of some of the most disadvantaged sections of the 
working class. While we wish to emphasise the mediation of neo-liberal 
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priorities for social policy through the concrete particularities of Scotland, the 
issues explored and arguments we advance here have a resonance well 
beyond any single national example. Under various noms de guerre it 
occupies a central place in the analysis of New Labour’s social and economic 
project and remains the pivot-point around which much of social policy is 
encoded and enacted. 
 
 
The Absent Presence of Class in Scotland 
While class has largely disappeared from view following devolution in 1999, 
save to recognise its role ‘merely’, and often at best, as only one of a series of 
dimensions or aspects of inequality and identity, class continues to assert 
itself as an absent presence throughout contemporary Scotland. By this we 
mean that class remains an unruly signifier of collective antagonistic social 
relationships, reproduced through conflictual social processes underlying the 
grossly unequal acquisition of material necessities (Bourdieu, 1984). This is a 
contradictory process. In conditions of generalised scarcity individuals without 
capital are compelled to enter the market as competitive monads to sell their 
labour power but are thereafter subject to collective exploitation in the 
production process itself. Classes are therefore formed by the intersection of 
two sides of a single process: on the one hand, the social division of labour 
itself (or the division of labour in exchange) and, on the other, the technical 
division of labour in the labour process (or the division of labour in 
production). Clearly the interaction of the division of labour in exchange and 
the division of labour in production internally stratifies the working class. This 
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conception of class gives lie to the idea that those with a precarious 
relationship to relatively well-paid, secure employment somehow form a 
separate class cut adrift from the rest of the working class (see Mészáros, 
1995).  
 
As formed and reproduced by the division of labour, class continues to be the 
primary factor in accounting for inequalities in health and morbidity, education, 
income, housing, diet, consumption, and so on. As such it also pervades - 
albeit largely unseen – huge swathes of policy-making discourses and 
academic discourses. Where it does surface, as we will argue below, it 
appears either as a passive description of an empirically-given reality, as in 
the Weberian classification schemas of academic social science, or, more 
commonly in public policy discourses, as a ghostly apparition, a metaphysical 
absent presence of being always materially there but simultaneously rendered 
almost opaque through the deployment of a range of class euphemisms and 
elisions. In other words class fails to be openly named. Instead, its feint 
outline is cast semantically in terms other than ‘class’. Notable here, and not 
only in the context of contemporary Scotland, are routinely repeated 
references to ‘the excluded’, to the ‘disadvantaged’, ‘the marginalised’, the 
‘deprived’. Such abject euphemisms are typically deployed to describe 
categories of people thought to be lying outside the conventional 
arrangements of social stratification and transform the impoverished working 
class into illegible ciphers for amoral cultures of despondency. In reality, these 
euphemisms refer, indirectly and curtly, to the existence of the patterning of 
inequality by the social and technical division of labour. Hence the trick is 
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accomplished of dispensing with the troublesome business of class as a 
social relationship by isolating a discrete social group from wider class 
relationships in order to return them for inspection and diagnosis by the 
ambiguous discourses of moral self-governance, above all in the valorisation 
of paid employment. Notable here is the collapse of class inequalities into the 
nebulous arena of ‘social exclusion’. 
  
In Scotland two other inter-related factors have worked to further dilute the 
salience of class. First, class has long been subordinated to and over-laid by 
the notion of a ‘Scottish national interest’ (see Bond et al, 2003). While this 
idea was especially evident through out the post-1945 period, it has been re-
invigorated following devolution where the construction, understanding and 
articulation of national social and economic ‘problems’ are framed less in 
terms of class than in relation to an apparently self-evident idea of ‘the 
Scottish nation’. Here the corporate domination of class interests by the 
‘national interest’ has been defined traditionally by the national institutions of 
middle class ‘civil society’ such as education, religion and law, and, latterly, 
the ‘welfare nationalism’ of the post-war period (Paterson, 1994; Law, 2005).  
 
Second, it is a short step from the determination of a national interest by the 
small middle class elite who occupy the institutions of ‘civil society’ to the idea 
that society as whole is somehow forged together into a higher national unity. 
The institutions of ‘civil society’ mysteriously displace the vulgar material 
division of society into classes and provide ‘society’ with a wholesomeness it 
would not otherwise possess. Even where social differences are registered, 
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the overwhelming picture remains of ‘Scotland’ as a singular, homogenous 
nation. Hence the distended nation, the ‘One Scotland’, is imagined as a 
horizontal, multicultural (though rarely vertical, multi-class) community of 
interests. Such thinking permeates policy-making rhetoric: 
 
One Scotland – a better Scotland – where all Scots can be proud to 
live in the best small country in the world. 
 (Jack McConnell, First Minister, Speech to Labour Party Conference,  
 Brighton, September 27, 2004) 
 
Strident efforts have been made by New Labour politicians, the Scottish 
Executive, policy-making and academic networks, and new and traditional 
elites to sell the idea of the ‘New’ Scotland as ‘One Nation’. This vision of 
‘One, New Scotland’ owes much to an uneven mix of diverse perspectives 
and ideas including: residual elements of an Old Labour-style social 
democracy, though the term social democracy has largely been replaced by 
the more ambiguous ‘social justice’ (see Scott and Mooney, 2005); more 
conservative notions of social order and community; and neo-liberal ideas of 
enterprise, the market and individual responsibility (Law, 2005).  
 
In the devolved Scotland significant sections of the working class are 
increasingly viewed as a hindrance to the Scottish ‘national interest’ by failing 
to develop an entrepreneurial spirit. In particular, some of the most precarious 
groups in Scottish society, made vulnerable by their unfettered exposure to 
the social division of labour, are increasingly seen as being ‘out of step’ with 
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what is now considered by New Labour and policy elites as ‘normal’ or 
‘mainstream’ Scottish society. Yet even those fractions of the working class 
with a relatively secure place in the division of labour find only a weak 
resonance with the political and institutional structures of New Scotland. No 
longer do Scotland’s middle classes view the established institutions of the 
working classes, such as trade unions and the Scottish Trade Union 
Congress (STUC), as a central part of the institutional culture of Scottish 
society. For the new elites in Scotland, the working class tend to feature only 
as an ever-present source of disappointment. On the one hand, the most 
dominated and impoverished groups constitute the source of respectable 
fears of social disintegration and criminality. On the other hand, where the 
employed working class are organised in trades unions, especially in the 
public sector, they are seen as refractory material to the necessity for 
managerial efficiencies and economies such that they constitute a hindrance 
to the competitive performance of neo-liberal Scotland. Here, the pre-
dominant discourse is that of fragmented, alienated, atomised, demoralised 
social groups as a problem to be targeted and overcome. As Chris Haylett 
(2003: 57) has succinctly argued, such ‘positioning has a cultural history 
through which working-class cultures and identities are cast as causal to 
problems of economic inequality and disorder’. This has taken on a particular 
resonance with the claim that ‘the Scots’ suffer from ‘a collective crisis of 
confidence’. Such a diagnosis helps explain Scotland’s under-performance in 
both the UK and global economies (Craig, 2003, 2005). Craig argues that 
deep-seated change in the Scottish national ‘psyche’ is necessary if Scotland 
is to be renewed. Craig (2005: 49) identifies: 
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…a proclivity in Scotland to emphasise the collective rather than the 
individual and this too has made it all too easy for us to assume that 
transformational change would be brought about from changes in the 
national structures, rather than from changes in our personal lives. 
 
Instead the structures of collectivity need to be disaggregated down to the 
level of the individual personality for Scotland to flourish: 
 
…if we want Scotland to become a society which is able come up with 
constructive solutions to the many problems which blight our society, 
feeling better about ourselves and feeling more positive would help us 
find these solutions. (Craig, 2005: 52) 
 
This kind of neo-liberal populist psychology finds a ready home among 
Scotland’s governing class. In addressing such a ‘problem’ the Scottish 
Executive and other ‘leaders’ of Scottish society work tirelessly to fashion the 
working classes in their own image: as entrepreneurs, as responsible citizens, 
as consumers exercising good taste, judgment and self interest, as orderly, 
restrained and law-abiding citizens, fully engaged in well managed 
communities. This represents an ideological mobilisation to re-assemble 
working class lives, particularly among the poorest and more disadvantaged, 





The Strange After-Life of Class in the New Scotland  
 
Amidst the post-devolution clamour to construct and project an image of ‘the 
New Scotland’ it is perhaps not surprising that ‘older’ concerns with class tend 
to be marginalised – or indeed forgotten. The new Scotland is as yet an 
uneven, at times partial and underdeveloped ideological construct, but already 
the key elements in this discourse can be identified. Scotland is perceived as 
a land that has undergone dramatic and fundamental change in the last few 
decades of the twentieth century. This discourse of ‘the New’ both underpins 
and permeates how journalists, academics, policy-makers and think tanks 
construct social, economic and political change. That there have been far-
reaching changes in Scotland in recent decades has widespread assent, 
though all too often the uneven, partial and contradictory nature of such shifts 
has yet to be acknowledged let alone explained. In 2001 a team of leading 
social scientists from Edinburgh University could breathlessly claim that: 
 
There is currently a real sense in Scotland that everything is changing; 
that nothing can be taken for granted..... The country is going through 
the closest to a social revolution that can be found in a developed 
western democracy. (Paterson et al, 2001: 167). 
 
More recently members of the same ‘Edinburgh school’ have marshalled 
considerable quantitative data to further their argument that Scottish society 
has undergone far-reaching change. Sociologists Frank Bechhofer (one of the 
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original researchers on the famed Affluent Worker study of the 1960s) and 
David McCrone (author of path-breaking study, Understanding Scotland 
(2001)), under a newspaper headline, ‘Scotland 2004: Why we’ve never had it 
so good’, refer to ‘a truly astonishing picture of a Scotland which has 
transformed dramatically even since adults in their mid-twenties were born’ 
(Johnston et al, 2004). In claiming that the Scotland of the early 2000s is 
‘barely recognisable as the same place of the early 1980s’, Paterson, 
Bechhofer and McCrone (2004: 149) focus on demographic, household, and 
employment shifts. However, what tends to be obscured is the profound 
continuities with the past, notably with regard to the highly unequal social 
relations of exchange and production that characterise Scottish society. In 
claiming that ‘for eight out of ten people, Scotland is a better place to live than 
25 years ago’ (Johnston et al, 2004), the Edinburgh school misdiagnose and 
underestimate the nature, extent and endurance of inequality, social 
antagonism and polarisation in Scottish society. There is some recognition 
that Scotland remains an unequal society: 
 
Nevertheless, one would require truly rosy spectacles not to see a 
much darker side. Amidst this largely benevolent change, Scottish 
society is seriously divided and stratified. The basis of stratification has 
changed somewhat, and the size of the disadvantaged segments of 
society has shrunk, but the nature and experience of the resulting 




What is being implied here is that poverty and related forms of disadvantage 
are almost marginal or residual features of contemporary Scottish society. 
And in deploying the troubling language of a ‘darker side’, there is a neglect of 
the processes that lead to polarisation and inequality, that between the 
accumulation of wealth and the accumulation of poverty there is unbreakable 
umbilical connection. Moreover, the conception of class, or rather 
‘stratification’, that is called upon differs in significant ways from our own.  
 
In such analyses, the working class, qua the working class, is deemed to be 
something that belongs largely to a bygone era of Scottish society. And yet 
we do not have to look far to see that ideas of class remain central to some of 
the long established and enduring myths that have tended to feature most 
prominently in representations of Scottish society. Such myths tend to cohere 
around claims that in some ways ‘the Scots’ are more inclined to be collective, 
social democratic, egalitarian (Gall, 2005) and that these inherent values, that 
insulate ‘the Scots’ against Thatcherism, now work to inoculate them from 
some of the more extravagant neo-liberal zeal of New Labour’s Blairite 
policies in the rest for the rest of Britain (Mooney and Poole, 2004).  
 
Indeed, for those like the Edinburgh school who recognise the extent of, and 
object to, the gnawing social deprivation in Scotland, at least the growing 
poverty of the 1980s and 1990s may have been halted, though not reversed. 
Here New Labour’s taxation policies and the minimum wage may have had a 
mildly redistributive effect, which in itself is insufficient to tackle endemic 
social polarisation. As the Edinburgh school put it: 
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What can be said is that policy since the change of UK government in 
1997 has at best brought to an end the widening of inequality that has 
been taking place since 1979. To go further and actually reduce 
inequality would require that governments, both at Westminster and 
in Edinburgh, embark on a more redistributive regime than at present 
seems likely. (Paterson, et al, 2004: 78). 
 
<insert Table 1> 
 
As Table 1 shows the number of people living in low income households after 
housing costs have been taken into account has remained stubbornly 
constant at around the million mark, out of a total population of just over five 
million. This impoverished twenty per cent consists of the working poor, the 
unemployed, children, the elderly and the sick. Neither has the pattern of 
wealth distribution altered course. If anything it has become more entrenched, 
with high levels of landownership and personal wealth held by very small 
groups of people. While real incomes may have risen on average for most 
categories of workers inequalities have also increased: ‘the wealth of the 
individuals and households at the upper end of the distribution is dramatically 
greater than that of those at the bottom end or indeed the vast majority of the 
population’ (Paterson, et al., 2004: 78). 
 
Such research suggests that the mythology of a ‘proletarian Scotland’ flies in 
the face of the new empirical reality that Scotland has become a more 
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affluent, middle class and ‘professional society’ in the past decade or so 
(Paterson, et al, 2004; McCrone, 2001). Thus the Edinburgh school point to 
evidence that the largest rise in occupational structure over recent decades 
has been in ‘lower managerial and professional’ jobs (see Table 2). Such 
shifts have led the Edinburgh group to the following insight: ‘If there is one 
dominant conclusion it is that Scotland is becoming a professional society in a 
much thorough way that it was even in the 30 years after the Second World 
War, when the professions came to dominate social policy and public life but 
still from their inherited position as a relatively small elite’ (Paterson, et al, 
2004: 101). This is compounded by a narrow identification of the ‘working 
class’ with the contracting manual workforce in the manufacturing sector. 
 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
Yet, working class identity and collectivist ideology in Scotland remains 
widespread, with more than half of ‘professionals’ identify themselves as 
‘working class’ (see Table 3). For Paterson, et al (2004: 99-101) the self-
misidentification and misattribution of the class position by those in 
‘professional’ occupations who see themselves as working class is a 
peculiarly Scottish phenomena that can be explained sociologically as a 
function of the recent experience of upward social mobility: ‘It seems that the 
continuing working class consciousness of the increasingly middle class 
society is probably because of upward social mobility’. To be seen as ‘working 
class’ is therefore culturally and politically important in Scotland even if it fails 
to correspond to socio-economic reality. On the other hand, it could be that 
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the category of ‘professional middle class’ covers a multitude of sins and that 
fewer occupations carry the traditional professional characteristics of task 
autonomy, independent decision-making and self-regulation. Here, the 
Edinburgh school prefer to emphasise the growth of industry-specific ‘re-
skilling’ of the Scottish workforce (Chapter 4), which somewhat belies the 
increase in generic credentials for most types of work. On the other hand, and 
in inversion of the ‘spiritually homeless’ salaried masses found in earlier 
studies of white collar workers that imagined themselves as ‘middle class’, the 
strength of working class identity in Scotland might correspond more closely 
to the proletarianisation of white collar occupations, including those depending 
on relatively high levels of credentialism, through work intensification and 
rationalisation, technological substitution, micro-managerialism and 
bureaucratic regulation. 
 
<insert Table 3> 
 
Advocates of the ‘Scotland as professional society’ thesis are echoing earlier 
discourses about the declining salience of class, especially the working class, 
in terms of ‘the affluent society’ or ‘post-industrial society’ theses. Such 
approaches adopt the broadly Weberian notion of class as a contractual 
indicator of the market power of individuals. As the Edinburgh school argue: 
‘Simply put, social class refers the structuring of power, mainly but not 
exclusively economic power, power in the marketplace, which differentiates 
people according to the skills and resources they are able to bring to the 
market, and the rewards they derive from it’ (Paterson, et al, 2004: 81). Here 
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the focus is one-sidedly on the possessive individualism of market conditions 
rather than in the ‘hidden abode’ of production where exploitation occurs. 
Insofar as production is discussed it is in general terms of occupational 
standing. Alternatively, class is secured by the prior structural relationship to 
effective ownership of the means of production. Class relations are given their 
specific colouration by the inequality between the value contributed by labour 
power in the production process (including the production of ‘services’) and 
the lower value represented by wages. In contrast, market power merely 
appears to equalise labour of different kinds and reward competing stock of 
individual power resources in terms of income. Individual exchange in the 
marketplace between equal individuals thus appears disconnected from class 
relations, above all the structural domination of labour by capital. Those 
unable to secure the sale of their individual labour power in the market, the 
unemployed, and hence stand outside of the immediate process of class 
exploitation in production, are saddled with an unsaleable commodity, their 
labour power, because it is not projected to add surplus value to a given 
composition of total social capital. Despite their own, admittedly surreptitious, 
commitment to redistributive social democratic values, the Edinburgh school 
eschews making their value judgements explicit: 
 
Some areas of Scotland are multiply deprived and a considerable 
proportion of Scotland’s people, probably around one in seven, are 
severely disadvantaged and unlikely to escape from this situation into 
better circumstances. It is not our task in this book to comment on the 
moral and political implications of the picture presented in this chapter or 
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indeed elsewhere, it is for the reader to draw her or his own conclusions. 
(Paterson, et al, 2004: 78) 
 
Such value-free neutrality attempts to let the empirical facts speak for 
themselves - even while imposing the ‘professional society’ thesis on them. 
Value-restraint severs the link between partisan politics and objective 
scholarship and places rationalist empirical methodology beyond critique. In 
refusing to ‘comment on the moral and political implications’ of their own 
evidence of substantial social suffering in Scotland the Edinburgh school 
pragmatically avoid public dissent with the Scottish state and maintain the 
stance of academic impartiality. Yet the Edinburgh school are not consistently 
value-neutral. Thus McCrone (2005, no page number) in an address to the 
British Sociological Association in Scotland claimed the legacy of critical 
sociology from, C. Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner, but especially from Tom 
Burns, who McCrone cites positively, arguing that sociology must question 
assumptions made ‘by people in authority in education, law, politics and so 
forth, about the behaviour of people’. Burns went on to elaborate: 
 
The practice of sociology is criticism. It exists to criticise claims about the 
value of achievement and to question assumptions about the meaning of 
conduct. It is the business of sociologists to conduct a critical debate with 
the public about its equipment of social institutions. (cited by McCrone, 
2005, no page number). 
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It is in this critical spirit, we would contend, that the study of class, state and 
nation in Scotland needs to be conducted. It can do so by locating class not 
simply as one stratification variable among many but as a necessarily 
exploitative social relationship that reduces moral worth to exchange value. 
Given that neo-liberal governance in Scotland and beyond is intent on 
establishing this as the essential disciplining power of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ it becomes necessary to return to the critical injunctions of the 
an earlier brand of Edinburgh sociology. 
 
Governing without class 
Besides the impartial academic slicing-up of class as various market 
positions, the idea of a ‘new’ Scotland is also being constructed in less value 
neutral ways. Here the Scottish Executive plays the major role in framing the 
new de-classed discourse. Scottish politicians, especially from the Labour 
Party, are not averse to drawing upon perceived ideologies and myths about 
Scottish civil society, particularly concerning its egalitarian and collectivist 
tendencies. However, such myths are also often constructed as nostalgically 
‘old-fashioned’, particularly when they are viewed as a hindrance to the 
Scottish Executive’s key goal of imagining the new Scotland as a vibrant’ and 
‘dynamic’ economy in which enterprise can flourish (see Bond et al, 2003, 
Law, 2005; Raco, 2002). Here we have a sharp juxtaposition of two 
Scotlands. On one hand, the ‘old’ proletarianised Scotland of largely male-
dominated industrial and manufacturing employment, urban squalor and 
welfare dependency (including ‘dependencies’ on council housing and ‘old 
style’ public services). On the other hand, the ‘new’ information/knowledge 
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society-based of today is typified by ‘de-classed’ private service sector work in 
call centres, retail, leisure, and tourism related-employment. A new Scotland 
is thereby posited in which the ongoing reform of public services – variously 
including housing stock transfer, PPP/PFI in education and in the health 
service, ‘new’ flexible working practices and managerialism – promotes 
personal ‘choice’ for consumers who stand outside of class categories. Here 
we have an archetypal case of what David Harvey (2005) calls ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’, where the shelter provided for social need by the public 
sector is broken into and its value confiscated by private capital to effect the 
renewed self-expansion of private accumulation at the expense of public 
services like pensions, health, education or housing. Accumulation by 
dispossession is a class-based project – class struggle from above – of which 
there are many exemplary cases in Scotland, just as there is of class-based 
resistance – class struggle from below – including the Scottish nursery 
workers strike in 2004 (Mooney and McCafferty, 2005). 
  
Neo-liberal thinking has become the new common sense among the political 
and policy-making intermediaries in Scotland. It is central, for example, to the 
2003 Partnership Agreement between the Scottish Labour Party and the 
Scottish Liberal Democrats, the governing coalition in the Scottish Executive 
where the pursuit of social justice and social inclusion is unambiguously 




The balance in Scotland’s economy now needs to make a shift. 
Improving public sector efficiency has had a significant part to play in 
the overall improvement in Scotland’s relative productivity.  
(Jack McConnell Legislative Programme, September 6, 2005, 
www.scotland.gov.uk) 
 
Here, as elsewhere, the new Scotland is constructed first and foremost in the 
language of the Scottish Executive as a ‘smart, successful Scotland’.  
 
All of this has significant consequences for welfare and social policy. 
Investment in social policy objectives and public services and, crucially, the 
routine practices of social policy, only make sense if they are economically 
framed, in the context here that they help ‘Scotland’ compete ‘in’ 
‘globalisation’. Neo-liberal capitalism is thus naturalised by New Labour as the 
limit point of all human activity and potentiality. Crucially, and to return to our 
argument above, there are a series of classifying practices at work in Scotland 
that seek to identify, construct and portray certain disadvantaged groups as 
beyond the ‘New Scotland’ mainstream, a brake on the drive to modernisation 
and competitiveness. Here the assumed value characteristics of Scottish 
working class-ness, reflected in cultures of poverty, moral decay and 
community disorder, are features of a wider welfare dependency that only 
undermines the efficiency of capital in Scotland. Much of this thinking, and the 
practices to which it gives rise, is driven by UK-wide New Labour policies 
especially, but not only, in relation to welfare to work, work activation 
strategies and criminal justice measures. Across the UK programme of 
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welfare restructuring there is a forging of a new national order of work, welfare 
and community, premised around the efficient functioning of the individual in 
the new division of labour. For this, new malleable subjectivities are 
necessary, always and everywhere premised around work and enterprise. 
Such subjectivities disavow class as a meaningful form of identity even while 
they re-impose class subordination to the divisions of labour in exchange and 
production. 
 
In Scotland, therefore, a conjuncture of UK-wide welfare reforms, 
constitutional devolution and neo-liberal capitalism propels the new de-
classed value structure. While the construction of a ‘modern’, ‘competitive’, 
‘future’, ’forward-looking’, and ‘new’ Scotland is presented matter of factly as a 
technical or administrative issue, this is essentially a vision of a country in 
which all aspects of daily life are collapsed into work-centred activities and 
modes of understanding. With the Scottish Executive, social inclusion, anti-
social behaviour, community, social capital and the pursuit of social justice are 
understood as principally economic issues, encapsulated in policy discourses 
of ‘competition and cohesion’. Here the diagnosis and prognosis of the 
permanent condition of class reproduction in Scotland is erased from view at 
a discursive level only to be constantly reproduced in practice through the 
new division of labour as an unforgiving social reality. 
 
We would further argue that the discursive de-classing of Scotland coupled 
with the ascendancy of professional and managerial intermediaries 
corresponds to closely what Bourdieu (1984) called the ‘new petit 
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bourgeoisie’. Such class intermediaries create new ‘needs’ rather than 
imposing moral norms among the dominated classes: 
 
The new petty bourgeoisies of course sees class, classifications as 
irrelevant, they are free to make their own taste in the precious but 
bloodless struggle against all taboos – yet they are fixed to a definite 
social space (Bourdieu,1984: 370). 
 
In Scotland, the new petit bourgeois includes the apparatchiks that mediate 
the new structures of devolved governance, preoccupied with the 
presentational issues of neo-liberal governance (Schlesinger, et al, 2002).  
 
Among the new petit bourgeoisie there is widespread unanimity that class is 
already extinct in Scotland, except for a supporting role in cultural edification 
or heritage nostalgia. Scotland is to be re-fashioned in their own self-image as 
entrepreneurial, dynamic and innovative. All this takes the primacy of market 
of the market as a given fact, with Scotland seeking to emulate Ireland as a 
‘celtic tiger’ economy. However, this vision of what MacAskill (2005) terms the 
new ‘Caledonian consensus’ simply wishes away the actuality of class 
relations.  
 
Clearly, we are much less sanguine about the discourse of a de-classed ‘new 
Scotland’, by which the Caledonian consensus promises to eliminate at a 
stroke all the troublesome business of unequal material reality and 
antagonistic socio-economic relations. Nor do we share the more 
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sophisticated ‘professional society’ thesis that is imposed on broad shifts in 
the occupational structure of Scotland. Class reproduction is always an open-
ended and unfinished process but it is one that necessarily re-composes 
relations of wage labour and capital accumulation on a renewed basis. Class 
denial or class minimisation strategies not only obscure and marginalise the 
continuing legacies of the past, not least in relation to the continuing salience 
and potency of class divisions in contemporary Scotland. They also construct 
opposition to what David Harvey (2005) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
as a relic of another (soon to be forgotten) time. De-classing reality is, we 
have argued, itself a class-based project that while denying or minimising 
class seeks to undermine recalcitrant working class cultures of solidarity. In 
the New Scotland, as elsewhere in the UK today, class-based forms of 
inequality continue to be reproduced, while simultaneously attempts to 
understand these through class analysis face patronising dismissal for 
refusing to face up to the new complexities of a transformed, looser, more 
socially mobile society. While this has distinctively Scottish dimensions to it in 
terms of constitutional change, sectoral restructuring and collective identity, 
this is not simply or solely a Scottish question but one that asserts the 
profound significance of class relations in the changing political and social 
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Table 1 - Proportion and Number of Individuals in Relative Low Income 
Households, below 60% of GB Median Income, Scotland, 1994/5 to 
2003/4 1 
 

























































1994/95 19 960 22 1,0
80 
26 280 28 300 16 490 18 540 22 190 27 240 
1995/96 18 920 22 1,1
20 






0 29 320 33 370 16 470 20 600 26 220 30 260 
1997/98 19 940 22 1,0
90 
29 310 30 330 15 460 18 530 19 170 25 220 
1998/99 19 930 22 1,1
10 
27 290 30 320 15 460 19 560 21 180 25 220 
1999/00 19 960 23 1,1
50 
26 280 30 330 16 480 20 590 23 200 26 230 
2000/01 19 940 23 1,1
40 
24 250 29 310 17 510 21 630 20 180 23 210 
2001/02 18 880 21 1,0
60 
25 260 30 320 15 460 19 560 18 160 20 180 
2002/03 19 940 22 1,0
70 
23 240 26 280 17 520 20 610 21 180 21 190 
2003/04 17 860 19 960 22 220 25 260 15 470 18 540 19 170 18 160 
1. Due to rounding, the estimates for children, working age adults and 
pensioners may not sum to the total for all individuals.  
2. 1996/97 is the baseline year 





Socio-economic classification of economically active population aged 16-74, 1991 and 2001 
% in columns Year 
Socio-economic classification 1991 2001 
Large employers and higher managerial 2 4 
Higher professional 5 7 
Lower managerial and professional 20 25 
Intermediate 17 13 
Small employers and self employed 8 8 
Lower supervisory and technical 10 10 
Semi-routine 17 16 
Routine 19 12 
Full-time student 1 4 
source: Census 2001 (Table 16); the balance of the percentages is people who could not be classified. 




Self-perceived class1, by broad socio-economic group, 1979 and 1999 
% in rows within year Year 
 1979 1999 










    
Professional and 
managerial 
42.2 50.0 51.8 43.5 
Intermediate non-manual 52.8 30.3 56.1 38.8 
Junior non-manual 71.6 19.3 72.6 26.1 
Skilled manual 78.4 10.8 82.8 14.6 
Semi-skilled manual 84.2 10.5 79.1 15.7 
Unskilled manual 81.3 6.3 79.6 15.3 
All 62.8 20.9 69.2 26.9 
source: Scottish Election Survey 1979 and Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 1999, in Paterson, et al 
(2004: 99) 
1 Balance in each year is percentage not acknowledging a class identity. 
 
 
